

FACILITY RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS CYBERSECURITY

CONCEPTS TO ENABLE SUCCESSFUL PROJECT EXECUTION

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August 2019

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BRIEFING OBJECTIVES

- High Level Snapshot of DoD & Army FRCS Cybersecurity Policy and Execution Timeline
- FRCS Unified Facility Criteria and Unified Facility Guide Specification Overview
- Key Considerations for Successful Project Execution



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FACILITY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS (FRCS)

- **FRCS consist of the control systems that operate Army facilities and represent a subset of a larger universe of control systems.**
- **FRCS are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attack due to greater network connectivity**
- **DoD and Army Policy Drivers**
 - 2014 DODI – Cybersecurity – Risk Management Framework (RMF)
 - 2015 Army Directive Risk Management Framework (RMF) for IT Systems
 - 2015 – ASA IEE directs IPT led by CIO-G6 for FRCS
 - 2016 – OSD Memo “Managing Cyber risks to FRCS
 - 2016 – UFC 4-010-06 Published
 - 2017 – UFGS 25 05 11 (Low Impact) Published
 - 2017 – Task Force Cyber Strong
 - 2018 – Army FRCS Cybersecurity Strategic Plan
 - 2018 – Army EXORD 141-18





Figure 1. Illustration of the Various Types of Facility-Related Control System




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ARMY FRCS CYBERSECURITY EXECUTION TIMELINE



UFC 4-010-06 *CYBERSECURITY OF FACILITY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS*




- Integrates the **DESIGNER** requirements supporting the Risk Management Framework (RMF) for facility-related control systems within design and construction projects. **DESIGNER** focused.
- Applies to all new construction and repair projects
- Published 19-September-2016
 - Whole Building Design Guide (www.wbdg.org)
- Relatively Narrow Focus – **DESIGN, NOT** life cycle (O&M)
 - Guidance to Designers-of-Record
 - Information from Designers-of-Record
- Impact System General Guidance
 - Details provided for **LOW** and **MODERATE** impact systems
 - **HIGH** impact systems require special attention



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UFGS 25 05 11 CYBERSECURITY OF FACILITY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS



- Consolidated all FRCS cybersecurity submittals and related testing into one specification. Covers **LOW** Impact Systems
- Published November-2017
 - Whole Building Design Guide (www.wbdg.org)
- Includes requirements in support of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) for implementing cybersecurity into construction projects for facility-related control systems.



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UFGS 25 05 11: CYBERSECURITY FOR FACILITY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS

- Covers **LOW** Impact Systems
- Update underway for **MODERATE** (Est. Publish Date 2nd Qtr. FY 20)
- Has to cover a **wide** range of systems and devices – ESS, HVAC, Fire, Elevator...
- Has tailored HVAC-specific requirements and “default” requirements for other systems
- Unfortunately, there’s some big gaps with long designer notes of the “go figure it out” sort
- Includes submittals needed to support System Owner RMF Authorization Package



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DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY, WHO OWNS THE PROBLEM??

- Multiple organizations are involved:
 - DPW/DES – system owner, operator, maintenance
 - NEC & R-NEC “Signal Brigade” – IP transport, C4IM Baseline Services
 - Building Tenant
 - Construction Agent
 - A/E Firm (DoR)
 - Potential of Multiple Authorizing Officials (System vs. Network)
- Different risks, different risk owners: Cyber risk, construction agent risk
 - Determination of roles & responsibilities up front are critical to project execution success .



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KEY CONSIDERATIONS

- Know who **OWNS** the FRCS (System Owner & RMF Authorization Official)
- Know the mission to which the FRCS is being designed to support and what is the **IMPACT** of the FRCS.
 - Not the designer's responsibility
 - Impact ratings provided by Government
 - Determined by SO in coordination with AO
 - But *may* have some give-and-take with designers to ensure that the delivery of a **FUNCTIONAL** system occurs.
- The UFC & UFGS is **NOT** RMF in its entirety.
 - System Shall (Design) vs. Organization Shall (O&M)

KEY CONSIDERATIONS

- Ultimately cybersecurity requirements are “what the system owner and authorizing official are willing to accept” without impacting the functionality of the system to meet its purpose.
 - Remember we are **NOT** designing and constructing cybersecurity systems, we are designing and constructing FRCS’s.
 - Don’t create a tail wagging the dog situation.
- So we can assume “default” requirements, but ultimately need to design to the requirements of the System Owner and Authorizing Official
- This means we need to make sure to coordinate design with them early and often – more so than for other areas



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KEY CONSIDERATIONS

- Contractors **CANNOT** provide an authorized system i.e. ATO, and we **SHOULD NEVER** give construction contractors general requirements like “meet cybersecurity”
- The design must define specific requirements, and those requirements must be met during construction and checked like any other requirement (Mechanical, Electrical, Structural, etc...)
 - UFGS defines the submittal schedule
- Specific contractual language is imperative to ensure success from both sides (Gov’t and Industry)
 - This is the entire focus of the UFGS



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QUESTIONS ?



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